THE INTERESTS

Of the ſeveral

Princes and States of *Europe*,

With reſpect to the Succeſſion of the

Crown of Spain.

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THE

INTERESTS

Of the Several

Princes and *States* of *Europe*

Consider'd, with respect to the

SUCCESSION

OF THE

Crown of Spain.

AND THE

TITLES of the several Pretenders thereto, Examin'd.

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The Intereſts of the Several Princes of *Europe*, with reſpect to the Succeſſion of the Crown of *SPAIN*, &c.

THE preſent Indiſpoſition of the King of *Spain*, ſeems to put a great part of *Europe* into a Conſternation: The Apprehenſion the moſt Judicious Perſons have of a Breach in the ſhort Tranquility this part of the World has enjoy'd, makes the Concern be very juſt: For they who know how ill we are able to enter upon a Second War, and what deep Inciſions the Laſt has made into the ſoundeſt Members of the Confederacy, have good reaſon to be very chary of the preſent Peace. 'Tis true, our Adverſaries have felt the Effects of the War, as well as We; and 'tis reaſonable to ſuppoſe, have as little need of another, as they had real need of the Peace. But what we know of *that* is but ſuppos'd; what we feel, we are ſenſible and ſure of. Beſides, the Caſe here would exceedingly differ; for the Kingdom of *Spain*, which perhaps were it rightly managed, is the Richeſt as well as the Largeſt Government in the World, is a thing ſo valuable, that 'tis preſum'd there is no Monarch in *Chriſtendom*, were he in the King of *France*'s ſtead, but would puſh for it at the extremeſt hazard. And the preſent King of *France* has never given the World any reaſon to expect he will omit the Addition of ſuch

a Trophy to his Glory, eſpecially when he has ſo high Pretenſions to the Claim.

In this Caſe it ſeems very proper to enquire a little into the preſent Proſpect of Affairs, as they reſpect the ſeveral Intereſts of the Princes of *Europe*, and what probable Effects the Deceaſe of his Catholick Majeſty may have, as to *Peace*, *War*, *and Trade*; that from thence we may judge what we ought to expect from ſuch an Event.

To come at a full underſtanding of the Caſe in hand, 'tis neceſſary to take a ſhort View of the Succeſſion of the Royal Family of *Spain*, and enquire who has the faireſt Claim, in caſe of the Demiſe of the preſent King.

The Houſe of *Auſtria* have had an undoubted Poſſeſſion of the Crown of *Spain*; and *Charles* the Fifth being choſen Emperor of *Germany*, enjoy'd a Sovereignty of the largeſt Extent, perhaps that ever any One Prince in the World had under his Government: For he had at once the Empire of *Germany*, the Kingdoms of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, of *Spain*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*; all the preſent *United Provinces* under the States of *Holland*; all *Flanders*, with the Countries of *Luxemburgh*, *Franche Comte*, and *Burgundy*; the Dukedom of *Milan*, the Iſlands of *Sardinia*, *Corſica*, *Majorca* and *Minorca*, with a boundleſs Empire in *Mexico* and *Peru*; beſides a multitude of Petty Sovereignties, Dukedoms, and Principalities. All this Vaſt Dominion, *the Empire of* Germany *and its Dependancies excepted*, deſcended to his Son *Philip*; who added to it the Kingdoms of *England* and *Ireland*, by his Marriage with Queen *Mary*; but that unhappy Match neither raiſing him any Children,

dren, nor keeping him in any long Poſſeſſion of this Crown, he loſt it by her Death; and in the next Reign, loſt the *Low-Countries* alſo, and by that long War ſo impoveriſh'd his own Kingdom, that it never recovered it to this hour. After his Deceaſe, he left his Kingdoms to his Son *Philip*, and he to *Philip* the Fourth, Father of the preſent *Charles* the Second, who has yet no Children.

Philip the Fourth left One Son and Two Daughters; the Eldeſt Daughter, *Maria Tereſia*, was married to the preſent *French* King, and was Mother to the preſent *Dauphin* of *France*; and in caſe of the Death of the preſent King of *Spain*, the *Dauphin* of *France* is Heir Apparent to the Crown of *Spain*, and to all its Dominions; and, one Clauſe excepted, has an Unqueſtion'd Title to the Succeſſion of the ſaid Kingdoms.

But in anſwer to the Succeſſion of the *Dauphin*, 'tis objected, That at the Marriage of *Lewis* the Fourteenth of *France*, with *Maria Tereſia* of *Spain* aforeſaid, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, with all the Princes of the Blood, did by a Writing under their Hands and Seals, ratified and exchang'd on the Borders, and firm'd by their Solemn Oath at *Fonterabia*, in the Year 1659, renounce and relinquiſh all Right or Title, Claim and Pretenſions for himſelf or his Succeſſors, which they or any of them had or ſhould have, by reaſon of any Alliance from the ſaid Marriage.

The *Spaniſh* Miniſters of State who foreſaw the poſſibility of a Claim upon the Crown of *Spain* from the Children of that Match, took all the care imaginable to bind His moſt Chriſtian Majeſty from ſo much as a Pretenſion to it, and to that end made the Words of that Oath as full, and the Ceremony of Making and Exchanging it, as Solemn and as Publick as poſſible.

How far His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will think himſelf bound by ſuch an Oath, time muſt determine. I know 'tis Argued, that the *Dauphin* and his Sons can be no way obliged by an Oath made by their Father or Grandfather before they were born; and that the Father could only relinquiſh for himſelf, but not for them, on whom the Right of Succeſſion devolv'd long after the Oath of their Father: That the Inheritance was a Natural Right to them, which their Predeceſſors had no power to diſpenſe with; and therefore they are no way concern'd in the Oath of Renunciation, but ought to Succeed, as if no ſuch Oath had been taken.

Though much might be ſaid on this Point, it being not the Deſign of this Paper, I ſhall only Note this; That whether the Oath by which His Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty Renounced the ſaid Succeſſion be binding to the *Dauphin* and his Sons or no; this is certain, That it is effectually binding to the King himſelf, if there be any ſuch thing as a binding Force in the Obligation of the moſt ſolemn and ſacred Oaths in the World.

Now if the Obligation be ſo ſacred as to the Moſt Chriſtian King himſelf, 'tis moſt certain the *Dauphin* or his Sons will never be Kings of *Spain*, if the ſaid Moſt Chriſtian King be ſo juſt to his Obligation as not to aid and aſſiſt them in puſhing at the Succeſſion.

The Emperor of *Germany*, who is the next Branch of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, is Heir to the Crown of *Spain* in caſe the Title of the ſaid *Maria Tereſia* be laid aſide, being the immediate Line of *Ferdinand*, Son to *Charles* the Vth, King of *Spain*; and not only ſo, but his Iſſue has a Claim by Virtue of his Marriage with

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Margaret Tereſia, the Second Daughter of *Philip* the IVth, by whom he had One Daughter, who was Married to the preſent Duke of *Bavaria*.

It may not be amiſs to Anſwer here a Queſtion which ſeems very naturally to be drawn from the Premiſes, *Viz.* Why ſhould the *Spaniards* make Proviſion to bar the Claim of the *French* by the Iſſue of a Daughter, and not the Claim of the Emperor whoſe Right is alſo by the Iſſue of a Daughter.

This is expreſly Anſwered by the Preamble to that Treaty in theſe Words: *Eſtant les Deux Couronnes ſi Grandes et ſi puiſſantes qu' elles ne puiſſent eſtre Reunies en Une ſeule et a fin que dez a preſent on previenne les Occaſions d' une pareille jonction*, &c. *Donques attendues les ſuſdites juſtes raiſons et Notamment de L'egalité qui ſe doit Conſerver leurs Majeſtez accordent et arreſtent par Contract et pacte Conventionnel entre elles qui aura Lieu force et Vigueur de la loy ferme et ſtable a tout jamais qui la ſereniſſime* Infante d'Eſpagne *ni ſes Enfans et leur deſcendants en quel degrè ils ſe puiſſent trover Voir a tout jamais ne puiſſent ſucceder es royaumes eſtats ſeigneuries et domination*, &c. *qui appartiennent et appartiendront a ſa* Majeſté Catholique *tant dedans que dehors le royaums* d' Eſpagne *Non obſtant toutes Loix ou Coutumes* &c. *aux quelles leurs Majeſtez derogent*, &c. In *Engliſh* thus: 'The 'Two Crowns being ſo great and ſo puiſſant that they 'cannot be united into One Kingdom, and that to the end 'that from this preſent all Occaſion of ſuch a Conjunction 'may be avoided, therefore upon due conſideration had of 'the aforeſaid reaſons, eſpecially that of Equality, which 'ought to be preſerved; it is Accorded between both 'their Majeſties, and by Mutual Covenant and Contract 'Ordained, which ſhall continue in the full force and 'vigor of a Law for ever, *That the moſt Serene* Infanta

of

of Spain, *her Children, nor Deſcendants, in what Degree ſoever, ſhall never Succeed in the Kingdoms, Signiories, or Dominions, which do or ſhall belong to his* Catholick Majeſty, *as well within as without the Kingdom of* Spain; *notwithſtanding any Law or Cuſtom, which hereby their Majeſties do Aboliſh.*

'Tis plain from this branch of the Contract, that a Union between *Spain* and *France* has been accounted by both Nations an improper, if not an impracticable thing. A Union with *Germany* has been known, and is coherent enough; but the Nature and Intereſt of the Two Crowns of *Spain* and *France* ſeem to have ſome particular Circumſtances which would make a Union fatal to them both; and therefore *Don Lewis de Haro*, the great Miniſter of State for the *Spaniards*, inſiſted on this Article with a great deal of Zeal.

I confeſs it ſeems to me that *Don Lewis de Haro*, the *Spaniſh* Miniſter, acted very different from the Character he had in other his Publick Management of the Affairs of *Spain*; for he who paſt for one of the greateſt Maſters in Politicks of his Age, and was the only man in all the *Spaniſh* Court, who was thought to be a Match for Cardinal *Mazarin* in the Famous Peace of the *Pyrennes*, was ſure very ill read in the Maxims of Princes, to think that a Treaty of Renunciation would ever be eſteem'd of force enough to limit the Ambition of Future Times, and to oblige Princes who were not then born The *Spaniards* were never taken for a Credulous Nation, and how they ſhould come to be drawn into ſuch a folly, ſeems very unaccountable. No doubt *Cardinal Mazarine*, who diſcover'd well

well enough the Event, ſuffered the *Spaniſh* Plenipotentiaries to go on at their own rate, and to call in the help of all the *Civilians* in the Two Kingdoms, to make an Inſtrument of Renunciation, knowing well enough that Titles to Crowns are generally diſputed by the Sword, not by Deeds and Inſtruments; and that the Succeſſion to the Crown of *Spain*, if ever it fell by the Demiſe of the Incumbents to the Heirs of that Marriage, would receive very little Obſtruction from ſo weak a Defence as the Paper of a Renunciation; for we find Contracts and Writings of that Nature, have very little effect againſt a Title to a Crown backt with an Army of 50000 men. The *Spaniſh* Miniſters acted the parts of men of Honour indeed, but not at all of Politicians.

Why alſo that refin'd Politician ſhould Marry the Eldeſt Daughter, where the Succeſſion ſhould require ſo ſtrict a Bar, remains undetermined; had he given the *Infanta* to the Emperor, and the Younger Daughter to the King of *France*, the Debate had been prevented; but poſſibly other reaſons might govern him, which we cannot judge of at this diſtance of time; and the *Infanta* being Married to the Moſt *Chriſtian King* Six Years before the Younger Daughter was Married to the Emperor, that Match might be made before a Marriage with the Emperor was in view.

Upon the whole, it appears by this ſhort view of the Succeſſion of the Crown of *Spain*, that the Two Daughters of *Philip* the Fourth, are the Immediate Heirs of *Charles* the Second, the preſent King, in caſe he Dies without Iſſue; the Eldeſt, who marri'd the King of *France*, has renounced her Claim for her ſelf and her Poſterity; and the next Right muſt devolve upon the Second,

cond, whoſe Title Deſcends to the Elector of *Bavaria*.

I am alſo to obſerve that the pretence, of *the Children of the King of* France, *not being bound by the Oath of their Father, and therefore their Succeſſion being clear*, ſeems fully anſwered thus.

The Renunciation was not ſo much a Perſonal Deed of the preſent King of *France* and the *Infanta* of *Spain*, as it was a mutual Compact between both *Kingdoms* paſs'd by a Treaty of Peace, and became a Law of each Country, made ſo by a publick Inſtrument Sign'd by the Nobility on each ſide, and agreed by a general Conſent of the Plenipotentiaries of both Parties, in the XXXIII[d] Article of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, in theſe words:

And to the end this Peace and Union, Confederation and good Correſpondence, might, as it is deſired, be ſo much the more firm, laſting, and indiſſolvible, both the ſaid Principal Miniſters, the Cardinal Duke, and the Marquis Earl Duke, by virtue of the ſpecial Power they have had for that end of the Two Lords and Kings, have Concluded and Agreed in their Names, the Marriage of the Moſt Chriſtian *King with the Sereniſ.* Infanta *the Lady* Maria Tereſia, *Eldeſt Daughter to the* Catholick King, *and the ſame Day bearing the Date of theſe Preſents, have Made and Subſcrib'd a particular Treaty, whereunto they refer themſelves touching the mutual Conditions of the ſaid Marriage, and the time of its Celebration; which Treaty by it ſelf, and Capitulation of Marriage, are of the ſame Force and Vigor with the preſent Treaty of Peace, as being the Chiefeſt Part thereof, and the moſt worthy as well as the greateſt and moſt precious earneſt of the ſurety of its duration.*

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This makes it appear that the Treaty of Marriage was really a part of the Treaty of Peace, and so became a publick Stipulation between the two Kingdoms, and an Act of the generality; so that not the King and Queen of *France* only personally, but the very Kingdom of *France* did solemnly concern it self in the Renunciation of an Union of the Crown of *Spain*, as a thing not fit to be done, for the Reasons expressly set down in the Preamble quoted before.

France having thus renounced the Crown, and all Claim to the Kingdoms and Dominions of *Spain*, the Second Daughter comes in with her Claim; and *Maria Teresia* stands with respect to *Spain*, as if she had dyed without Issue. The Second Daughter of *Philip* the Fourth, was *Margaret Teresia*, married to *Leopold* the Sixth, present Emperor of *Germany*, by whom he had Three Sons and One Daughter; which Daughter, the Sons all dying young, was married to the present Duke Elector of *Bavaria*, and died in 1691, leaving him one Son, to whom the Crown of *Spain* descends by a plain and direct Title, founded on the Renunciation agreed on by the *Pyrenean* Treaty.

If the Son of this Princess dies without Issue, the *German* Line of the House of *Austria* succeeds, deriv'd from *Ferdinand* Brother to *Charles* the Fifth, Son of *Philip* the First, King of *Spain*, who left Three Sons,

Maximilian,
Ferdinand, and
Charles.

Maximilian succeeded his Father in the Empire, and left it to *Rodulph* the Second, his Son; and he dying a Batchelor, *Matthias* his Second Son succeeded in the Em-

pire; and he alſo dying without Children, *Ferdinand* the Second, Son of *Ferdinand* the Firſt, was choſen Emperor, who had ſeveral Children, but all died without Iſſue; ſo the Family was preſerv'd in *Charles* the Third Son of *Ferdinand* the Firſt, who among Fifteen Children had one Son, *Ferdinand* the Third of the Family, but as Emperor was known by the Name of *Ferdinand* the Second, who was Father to the Emperor *Ferdinand* the Third, and he to the preſent Emperor *Leopold* the Sixth of the Family, but the firſt Emperor of the Name, whoſe Eldeſt Son *Joſeph* is King of *Hungary*, and King of the *Romans*; whoſe Right to the Crown of *Spain* is Clear and Unqueſtion'd, ſtill founded upon the former Renunciation.

The Duke of *Savoy* has alſo ſome Pretenſion to the Crown of *Spain*, as he is Great Grandſon of *Charles Emanuel*, Duke of *Savoy*, by *Katherine*, Daughter to *Philip* the Second.

The Titles being thus diſcuſs'd, we come to examine how the ſeveral Intereſts of the Princes of *Europe* ſtand, with reſpect to the Succeſſion, in caſe his Catholick Majeſty ſhould dye.

To begin with the Princes of *Italy*; and firſt with *Savoy*: The Dukes of *Savoy* have always upheld their Fortunes by the Antipathies of the powerful Princes by whom they are environ'd, the *Emperor*, *Spain*, and *France*; either of them ſingly have had both Power and Will to cruſh the *Savoyard*, but neither enduring to let the other ſeize him, he has ever had a Protector of the one, when he has had an Invader of the other. 'Tis true, this has often made his Country the Seat of the War, and his very Capital City *Turin* has been alternately Gariſon'd by *French*, *Spaniards*, and *Germans*.

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The preſent Duke is entirely in the *French* Intereſts and in a fair way to leave his Dominions in the *French* Poſſeſſion, having married his Daughter to the Hopes and Fortune of *France*: But if he has yet any Sons, it cannot be his Intereſt to have the Dutchy of *Milan* fall into the hands of the *French*, who will then perfectly enviro[illegible]im in their own Territories. Princes may take this or that Party, with reſpect to Wars foreign to their own Dominions; but in their own particular Caſes they are always governed by their Intereſts. If the Duke of *Savoy* has any regard to the Succeſſion of his own Family he cannot but know that if the Kingdom of *Spain* falls into the hands of the *French*, the *Milaneſe* does ſo alſo; and he and his Succeſſors are as abſolutely in the power and at the diſpoſe of the King of *France*, as any Governor of a Province in his own Countrey; and the powerful Aſſiſtance of the *Spaniard* is for ever ſunk as to him; ſo that it cannot conſiſt with the Safety of the Duke of *Savoy* to have the *French* poſſeſs *Spain*. 'Tis true, the Emperor may aſſiſt him, but the *Griſons* muſt be ask'd leave to admit Succours through their Countrey; which though they do generally grant, yet ſuch an Aid is remote, and the Motions of the *Germans* very ſlow: So that indeed to have the *French* poſſeſs'd of *Spain*, is to put the Dukes of *Savoy* under an Abſolute Dependance on the Power and Will of the Kings of *France*.

The Dukes of *Mantua*, *Parma*, and *Modena*, with the Republick of *Genoa*, will be in little better condition; for the Countries of *Savoy*, *Piedmont*, and *Milan*, have always been a Frontier to them, to defend them from the Inſults of the *French*; as may very well appear by the care they took this laſt War, to get rid of the *French* Gariſon in *Caſal*.

In the *South* and *East* parts of *Italy*, the Caſe will be little better; for with the Crown of *Spain* the Kingdoms of *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Sardinia*, become likewiſe *French*; the firſt of which admits them into the heart of *Italy*, where they may ſhake hands with the *Venetians* on one ſide, the Great Duke of *Tuſcany* on the other, and the Eccleſiaſtical Territories on [illegible] other; and the laſt gives him an entire Dominion over the whole Trade of the Weſt part of the *Mediterranean* Sea. In a word, the *Spaniſh* Dominions in *Italy* falling into the hands of the *French*, would ſo involve the whole Country, that it would lie wholly at his Mercy, and depend entirely upon his Favour; and whoever gives himſelf leave to conſult the Hiſtories of the Wars in *Italy*, the many attempts made by the Kings of *France* to get but a footing in that Delicious Country, may with eaſe conclude what uſe they would make of ſo advantageous a Seiſure as this. *Francis* the Firſt, was the moſt eager Competitor with the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth, for the Dominion of *Italy*; and the Princes of *Lombardy* owe their preſent Eſtabliſhment and Tranquility to the Succeſs of the Emperor's Forces in that great Battel of *Pavia*; for had King *Francis* gain'd that Battel, 'tis more than probable he had united all the North of *Italy* to his Crown; and this very humour of King *Francis*, who was a Warlike and an Ambitious Prince, was the very reaſon why he was not Elected Emperor in the ſtead of *Charles* the Fifth, leſt he ſhould either ſlight or attempt the ſubduing of the Petty-States of the Empire; though they mended not the matter, the very ſame Deſign being afterwards formed by *Charles* the Fifth, whom they Elected at that time. And thus 'tis in *Italy* now the petty Princes of *Italy* are

are neither willing nor able to injure *France*, and are very well ſatisfied with being ſcreen'd behind the *Milaneſe* by the *Spaniard* and *Savoyard* from an Irruption from *France*.

France has ſeveral times been Maſter of a great part of *Italy*. *Pepin*, and *Charlemaign*, having Conquer'd the *Longobards*, gave all the Eccleſiaſtical Territory in *Italy* to the Chair; and ſince that, *Italy* has been often changing Maſters, and the Popes have as often been haraſs'd, one while by the Emperor of *Germany*, and other while by the *French* and *Spaniſh* Power; and to prevent the like for the future, the conſtant Maxim of the Eccleſiaſtical Councils, has been to keep a due Balance between thoſe Three Powers, that neither of them may be too powerful for one another, and then he is ſure the Peace of *Italy* ſhall not be diſturb'd. In this caſe the ingenious *Puffendorff* in his Introduction to the Hiſtory of *Europe*, gives his Opinion thus: *I am apt to believe*, ſays he, *the Popes would be glad the* Spaniards *were driven out of* Italy, *eſpecially out of the Kingdom of* Naples; *but it is ſcarce to be ſuppoſed he ſhould be able to do it in his own ſtrength; and to make uſe of the* French *would be to fall out of the Frying-pan into the Fire; therefore all the Pope can do is to take care that* Spain *may not Encroach upon others in* Italy; *and there is no queſtion but if the* Spaniards *ſhould attempt any ſuch thing*, France *and all the other* Italian *States would be ready to oppoſe their deſign; neither can it be pleaſing to the Pope, if the King of* France *ſhould get ſo much Footing in* Italy, *as to be able to ſway Matters there according to his pleaſure, which the Pope ought to prevent with all his might.* If this be true, what then can the Pope or any of the *Italian* Princes expect, if the *Spaniards* and *French* ſhould be united,

and

and Encroach upon them in one body, they would effectually drive them all out of *Italy* whenever they pleaſed? All the Refuge they could have, would be the Empire, which how able it would be to Cope with *France*, in ſuch a Caſe, time only can determine. To me it ſeems more than probable, that a Union of the Kingdoms of *France* and *Spain* would be an entire Reduction of whole *Italy* under the ſame Power; for there is not that part of *Italy* which the Monarch of that Union would not really have ſome Dormant Pretenſion to, either as King of *Spain*, or King of *France*, or King of *Naples*, or Duke of *Milan*, except the Territories of the Republick of *Venice*, and ſome of them would not be entirely free neither.

The next Country which is moſt nearly concern'd againſt this Union, and in moſt danger from it, is the Kingdom of *Portugal*. As the *Spaniard* is now a poor and effeminated Nation, *Portugal* is ſecured by its own ſtrength. In the time that the Power of *Spain* was formidable to *Europe*, *Philip* the Second no ſooner Invaded *Portugal* than he ſubdued it; for there is no Compariſon between the Forces of the Two Kingdoms; and had not the *Spaniſh* Power been broken by other fatal Loſſes againſt *England* and the Low-Countries, I ſuppoſe 'twould not be improper to ſay *Portugal* had remain'd a Province of *Spain* to this day. In th year 1640, while *Philip* the Fourth was involv'd in ſeveral Troubles, as in particular the Revolt of the *Catalonians*, the *Portugueſe* ſhook off the *Spaniſh* Government, and ſet up *John* Duke of *Braganza*; and yet even this Revolt had not been able to have been made good, had not the *French* privately aſſiſted them under the Command of Duke *Scomberg*,

Scomberg, by whoſe Conduct they won the famous Victory of *Villa Vitioſa*; and yet after this, had not the Diverſion the *French* made in the *Netherlands*, made the *Spaniards* willing to clap up a Peace with *Portugal* on any terms, the *Portugueſe* could not have held out. The Sum of all is this, That *Portugal* is not able to ſupport it ſelf againſt *Spain* without a Foreign Aſſiſtance. Now if *Spain* and *France* Unites under one Power, whenever that Power pleaſes to demand the Crown of *Portugal*, it muſt and will be ſurrendred to it.

Wherefore 'tis the Intereſt of *Portugal* by all poſſible means to prevent this Union; what thoſe means are, I refer to its proper Head.

The *Swiſs*, the *Griſons*, and the City of *Geneva*, are the next concern'd in this Affair: I know ſome are apt to ſay, that the greateſt loſs the *Swiſs* are like to have on this occaſion will be want of Employment, which they have always found in the Wars between *France* and *Spain*; but, perhaps, it might be anſwered by ſaying, They may chance to find Employment enough in defending their own Countrey; for it is not to be queſtioned but the King of *France*, who would then be Lord of all the Countries *Southward* of the *Griſons* and *Swiſs*, would be very fond of making that Warlike People his Subjects, both for the advantage of having a power to force them into his Armies, and alſo of ſtopping the paſſage of the *Germans* that way into *Italy*; and indeed the impoſſibility that ſeems to lie on the *Swiſſers* of maintaining their Neutrality, makes it almoſt natural to believe the New Monarch will attempt all feaſible methods to bring them over

over to him, if it be only to anticipate the *Germans* and prevent their being Parties with the Emperor.

'Tis true the *Swiſs* are a Fighting People and not eaſily conquered, and a Poor People not worth conquering; there is nothing to be had from them but Blows and barren Mountains; but yet the Reaſons aboveſaid would, in caſe of ſuch a Union as we ſpeak of, make it abſolutely neceſſary to the *French* to make themſelves Maſters of them, coſt what it would. 'Tis confeſs'd ſome of the moſt Powerful Princes of *Europe* have attempted the *Swiſs* in vain; as *Leopold* Archduke of *Auſtria*, whom they defeated and kill'd at the Battel of *Sempach*, *Anno* 1444. And *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy* at the Battel of *Granſon* was routed by the *Switzers*, though he was a Gallant Soldier, and had in his Army an 100000 Men; and it would be a very difficult thing for the ſtrongeſt Power of *Europe* to make a Conqueſt of them by Force; but the preſent King of *France* has found other ways to Conquer, beſides downright Fighting, and the *Swiſs* who are a needy People, may, perhaps, be as eaſily divided as another Nation, by the help of Money eſpecially, their Government being compoſed of two different Religions, and each Party very poſitive and zealous in their own. If therefore the *French* and *Spaniſh* Monarchies ſhould unite, the *Swiſs* may find it very difficult to maintain their Confederacy, either from the Force or the Subtilty of their Great Neighbour: For in caſe of ſuch a Union, the Monarch of that Empire will preſently ſee, that to get the *Swiſs Cantons* under his Power, will be the firſt and moſt neceſſary work to employ his Politicks; for it would be the only way to ſecure himſelf from any diſturbance in his entire Reduction of *Italy*. So that it muſt be of the laſt Conſequence to the *Swiſs Cantons*,

to

to prevent such a mighty Union in *Europe*, which seems to bring with it a necessity of involving them in a War with the most Invincible Power of Two united Monarchies; in which War they must of necessity at last submit or be conquer'd; for a Victory obtain'd by them, could have no other Tendency, than to make their Terms of Accord the easier; which they must always be bound to preserve at the Price of a War, whenever their Potent Neighbour please to impose upon them. As to Trade indeed, the *Swiss* are not much concern'd, because they Trade little but among themselves, nor have no Sea-Port for Foreign Trade, nor any Manufactures to export.

The Empire of *Germany* is the next to be consider'd: The Conjunction of *France* and *Spain* seems to threaten *Germany* with a fatal and a bloody War; the Frontiers of *France* and *Spain* united, extend in length, fronting the Limits of the Empire, for a contiguous Range of near a Thousand Miles, if the *Swiss Grisons* and the *North-East* part of *Italy* are included, as they are of necessity to be.

'Tis true, the Emperor of *Germany* is not under an absolute necessity of quarrelling with this supposed Empire; but the Circumstances of *Italy*, which has so many Fiefs and Dependancies on the Empire in it, are such, that it seems impossible, speaking of common Politicks, that the *French* should possess the *Spanish* Dominions in *Italy*, and not commence a War with the Emperor of *Germany*; for the *Italian* Princes cannot subsist in *Italy*, without being incroach'd upon in such a case; and the only Prince they can have recourse to for Protection, is the Emperor: Possibly it may be the truest Interest of the Emperor to lye still at this time, and rather prose-

cute his Wars againſt the *Turks* with his utmoſt Vigor, by which he gains an extraordinary Glory as well as Revenue; and that being once happily finiſhed, he may be the better able to cope with ſuch an United Power: For as he is now engaged in his Wars in *Hungary*, it muſt be own'd that the Empire of *Germany* would be in very great danger, and a very unequal Match to the *French* upon the *Rhine*. It is without queſtion the preſent Intereſt of the Emperor to preſerve his Peace, becauſe the Towns which are to be reſtored by the preſent Peace are not yet quitted by the *French*; but that once done, the Emperor might with the greater advantage preſerve the Peace of the Empire, and transfer the War into *Italy*, where the *Germans* always fight cheapeſt, and the *French* deareſt.

The Emperor's Intereſt in this Affair lies diſtinguiſh'd with reſpect to the ſeveral parts of the Empire. The States of the *Lower Saxony*, whoſe Troops, together with the *Swabian* and *Franconian* Circles, compoſe the Forces on the *Rhine*, are maintain'd by *Quota's* at the Charge of the ſeveral Princes of the Empire, and the ſame Princes are an inexhauſtible Magazine of Men and Money, and perhaps well united are invincible as to the *French*. In *Italy* the *Germans* can maintain the War three parts in five cheaper than the *French*, becauſe the Feudatories of the Empire bear their proportion: But if the *French* by this Conjunction unite alſo the *Italian* Princes, the Heat of the War between the Emperor and the *French* is moſt probable to lye on the Frontiers of *Bavaria*, or the Lower Parts of *Auſtria* and *Bohemia*, the Emperor's Hereditary Dominion, which indeed is the tendereſt place the Emperor can be touch'd in.

'Tis

'Tis true, that *Germany* united is a moſt formidable Empire; but the preſent Condition of the Empire, very much weakned by this laſt War, and involved in a vigorous War againſt the *Turks*, is ſuch as renders it in but an ill Condition to engage in ſo bloody and expenſive a War as this would be. 'Tis therefore the Intereſt of the Empire with all its Might, by way of prevention, to ſecure the Crown of *Spain*; that by ſuch an addition the *French* Greatneſs might be curb'd and reſtrain'd, and the *French* anticipated in all their vaſt and ambitious Deſigns upon *Italy*.

The King of *Poland* ſeems to be the only Prince that will be eaſy at this Union, and that only as it ſerves his preſent purpoſe, by diverting the *French* from diſturbing him in the peaceable Poſſeſſion of his new-gotten Kingdom. The diſorders of his Government ſeem to grow upon him, and the Party of the Prince of *Conti*, or the Cardinal Primate rather, are only upheld by their expectation of Succors from *France*, in order to diſpoſſeſs the preſent King: Now this Union of *France* with *Spain*, may be beneficial to the King of *Poland*, only as it may divert the Court of *France* from raiſing and encouraging Rebellions and Diſorders in his Affairs, before he is well ſettled in his new-gotten Dominions: And yet the King of *Poland* will not approve of this Conjunction, as a Friend to the *French* Intereſt, nor any way, but as he would be glad of any Circumſtance that would divert the *French* from giving him diſturbance in the particular Settlement which he has before him.

The *Dutch* are the next State moſt concern'd in ſuch a Conjunction; were it not for *Flanders* the

Dutch would have no manner of concern upon them, but what reſpected Trade only; of which by it ſelf. But as they now ſtand with reſpect to the ſeveral Provinces of the *Spaniſh Netherlands*, to have thoſe large and populous Countries fall into the hands of the *French*, would be of the moſt fatal Conſequence to their Affairs of any other event that could poſſibly befal them.

Their Territory is entirely encompaſs'd with the *Flemings*, *Legois*, and *Germans*, and that ſubtle Government have at all times taken ſpecial care to keep off the Neighbourhood of the *French*, and have ever ſo ordered the matter, that they have had ſome or other ſtrong Town of the *Spaniards* to ſtand between them and danger; what they are to expect from the Neighbourhood of the *French*, they have room enough to judge from their own ſad Experience in 1672, when the *French* broke into the Bowels of their Country, and like a Torrent bore down all before them; if then the *Spaniſh* Low-Countries fall into the hands of the *French*, as by ſuch a Union they would immediately do, the *Dutch* would be even Beſieged by the *French* Power from the Mouth of the *Scheld* to the *Rhine*, and have no Frontier but their own Towns; and on the leaſt breach between them and the *French*, their own fruitful Countries which they have hitherto been ſo Chary of, would become the Seat of the War, and be impoveriſht and over-run with the Numerous Armies of *France*.

In a word; It does not ſeem very probable that the *Dutch* can maintain their Commonwealth, but will fall a certain Prey at ſome time or other, to the overgrown Greatneſs of the *French* Monarchy; for they have but two ways of ſupporting themſelves, by War

or

or Peace; the firſt muſt be Precarious, and at the Abſolute Will of the *French*; and the laſt will be deſtructive to them. There is a vaſt difference between the Charge of a War maintain'd Abroad, and the Deſolations of a War brought Home to our own doors. While the *Dutch* maintain'd their Army, and ſent them into *Flanders* to Fight; the War, though it was long and very bloody, yet was eaſy to them; but to have the *French* Army in the Bowels of their Country, leaves nothing but Ruin and Deſolation behind; witneſs the Rage of the *French* Armies at *Swamerdam* in the Years 1672, and 1673.

The *Dutch* by their hired Troops are a very powerful State; but are on the other hand the worſt of any Nation in the World to entertain a War in their own Dominion, becauſe they are ſo exceedingly dependant upon the openneſs and freedom of Trade, which if it be once Obſtructed, as to be ſure it muſt be by ſuch a kind of a War, they are preſently impoveriſht. The Uniting the *Spaniſh Netherlands* to *France* by this Succeſſion, would leave *Holland* in a manner quite naked of all its defence, and expoſed to the Will of the *French*; for if *Flanders* be loſt, all the Blood and Treaſure ſpent by the whole Confederacy in Three long and chargeable Wars, for the reſcuing *Flanders* out of the *French* hands, would be loſt, and all the labour of the King of *England* and his Armies would be utterly loſt.

The *Dutch* are certainly expoſed to the laſt degree, and in ſo much danger of being abſolutely ſubdued in ſuch a caſe, that I think they are concern'd in the higheſt degree, to prevent, if poſſible, ſuch an Union as that, which would to them be the moſt fatal thing in the World.

We

We come in the next place to examine how *England* ſtands with reſpect to ſuch an Union; *England* is not one jot leſs concern'd in the matter than *Holland*; the King of *England*, whoſe Hazards in *Flanders* may ſeem needleſs to thoſe who underſtood no better, has given ſufficient Teſtimony of his Opinion how much the ſafety of *England* depends upon maintaining the Frontier of *Flanders* as a Barrier for the Kingdom againſt the Inſults of the *French* Nation: and indeed, if nothing but the prodigious increaſe of the Naval Strength, which *France* would attain by ſuch an Union, were conſidered, it would be ſufficient to make all the *Northern* parts of *Europe* join their Intereſt againſt it. I noted in the Article about the *Dutch*, the naked Condition they would be in with reſpect to a War by Land; but ſhould the *French* once make themſelves Maſters of *Flanders*, and of ſome of the *Dutch* Ports and Harbours in the *Scheld*, or the *Maez*, the addition of their Naval Strength would make them too great a Match for all *Europe* at Sea.

The preſent Conjunction of the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* Fleets have not without great difficulty preſerved the Command of the Sea during this War; the Advantages gain'd by it are viſible to the meaneſt underſtanding; and I queſtion whether it would be poſſible to maintain that Command in caſe of ſuch a Union. The preſent growing greatneſs of the *French* Genius infus'd by vigorous Councils into the *Spaniards*, may once again make them, as they formerly were, the moſt Powerful Nation in the World, both at Land and Sea; if then the *French* and *Spaniard* United, ſhould make themſelves in proportion too ſtrong at Sea for the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*, they may bid very fair for a Univerſal Empire over this part of the World.

Our

Our Intereſts in the *Weſt-Indian* Colonies of *America*, come next into Conſideration. 'Tis abſolutely neceſſary for the ſecurity of our Plantations, whoſe extent is exceeding great, that no Union be made between the *French* and *Spaniſh* Dominions; otherwiſe the whole Trade from theſe parts of the World, to both *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*, may lie at the mercy of the *French*: For *England* and *Holland* being Nations ſubſiſting and depending wholly upon Trade and Foreign Negoce, any Union in the World, which ſhall be too ſtrong for them at Sea, may in the end reduce both thoſe Nations to what Terms and what Subjection they pleaſe. And this leads us to the other great Conſideration of this Union, as it reſpects

The Intereſt of Trade in the World.

The Intereſt of Trade is the Intereſt of Nations: Peace is the end of War, *or at leaſt ought to be ſo*: Trade is the end of Peace, and Gain is the end of Trade.

The Trade of *Europe* is principally in the hands of the *Engliſh*, *Dutch*, and *Spaniards*; from the two former to the latter, in Manufactures of their own Growth and Operation. The *Spaniards*, who are a Nation that make the beſt Return in Trade of any Nation in the World, *namely*, *Bullion*, may be ſaid to ſuffer us to Trade with them, rather than they to Trade with us: They are a ſubtle, but a very ſlothful Nation; they buy almoſt all their neceſſary things of Foreigners, they have in a manner no Manufacture among them, they hardly make their own Cloaths; and in return, the Growth of their Countrey, as Wines, Oyls, and Fruits, are brought back, and the Overplus

Overplus made up by Exchange, ſupplied by the Bullion of their *Weſt-Indies*.

As a further demonſtration of the ill husbandry of the *Spaniards* in Trade, it appears that all the Trade carried on with them by the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*, is carried on upon our own Stocks; and ſome have ventured to ſay, that the *Engliſh* Effects in *Spain* do not amount to leſs than 50 Millions *ſterl.*; which way of Trade has always been the greateſt Ligament of the Peace between the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*, and the *Spaniard*: For on the firſt occaſion of a Rupture with theſe Countries, the immediate courſe the *Spaniard* takes, is to ſeize upon all the *Engliſh* or *Dutch* Merchants, and confiſcate their Effects, which are always ſo conſiderable, as that thoſe Nations have no Equivalent to lay hold on by way of Repriſal. 'Tis true, they have taken their Plate-Ships, and ſometimes plunder'd the Coaſt-Towns in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, which at beſt would be but a ſmall Amends, to the Seizure of the Effects of ſo many Merchants.

Nay, they are not only ſo ill Merchants as to ſuffer Strangers to engroſs their Trade, but even thoſe Strangers, as if the *Spaniards* were neither able to manage, nor fit to be truſted with Buſineſs, employ all Agents, Factors, and Servants of their own, ſent over and reſident among them, with the ſame Methods as they Plant amongſt the moſt barbarous Nations of *Africa*; and by this Method the Trade of *Spain* is ſo managed, that whatever it be to the *Spaniards* themſelves, 'tis certainly a Trade exceeding gainful to the Merchants of theſe Countries in particular.

1. As it occaſions the Conſumption of their Manufactures, and from thence the Improvement of their Stocks

Stocks at home; by which the whole Countries are enrich'd, and the Poor employ'd and ſupported.

2. As it makes a Return of Bullion, which is the greateſt Advantage that can accrue to Trade; for Manufactures exported, and Bullion return'd, make always an Account of Profit to the Publick Stock of a Nation.

3. An Increaſe of Navigation, and Encouragement to Seamen; the *Spaniards* not only Trading with us all in our own Veſſels, but employing our Ships in their own Affairs from Port to Port, in *Italy* eſpecially.

In caſe of a Union with *France*, 'tis very probable the Channel of Trade to *Spain* may be entirely alter'd: The *French* are a buſy Trading Nation themſelves, and are very apt to vye with the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* in their Manufactures: And to go no further, when 'tis in their power to admit their own Merchants to import their Manufactures Cuſtom-free, while we ſhall pay 23 *per Cent.* 'tis eaſy to ſee that our Trade thither muſt dye.

I know it will be objected here, That the chief Export of *Engliſh* Manufactures is to *Cadiz*, for the Trade by the Galeons to *New Spain*, *&c.*; and that if the *French* ſhould by their Conjunction any way diſcourage that Trade, it is but our opening a Correſpondence from *Jamaica* to their *Weſt-Indies*, and we ſhould be as great Gainers, and the Trade from *Spain* by the Galeons, be very much impair'd.

By the Treaty of Commerce between the two Nations, it is ſtipulated in particular, *That the King of* England *ſhall not permit any of his Subjects to Trade, Correſpond, or Sail to or with any of the Subjects of his Catholick Majeſty in the* Weſt Indies: The reaſon was, that the Trade from hence to *Spain* being ſo conſiderable by the way of *Cadiz*, and the return ſo good,

keeping it in that Channel, would be the only way to maintain that beneficial Negoce to advantage: Whereas ſupplying the *Indies* directly from *England*, would be very prejudicial to the particular Trade of *Spain* it ſelf, the Navigation from *Cadiz* to the *Havana*, and in general to the whole Trade.

Now the moſt effectual Method of prohibiting this Trade, has appear'd to be obſerving the Prohibition ſtrictly at our Colonies and Iſlands in *America*, *Jamaica* in particular: For did our Government give the Liberty to Trade from *Jamaica* to *New Spain* directly, the *Spaniards* are ſo eager to Trade, that all the Precaution their own Government could uſe to prevent it, would be to no purpoſe: And there is this reaſon to be given for it; That the Sale from the *Engliſh* by the way of *Jamaica* is ſo much cheaper than that by way of *Cadiz*, and yet our Merchants great Gainers too, that the *Spaniards* of *America* will run all hazards to get our Goods on ſhore, and coming off to us in Sloops and Canoes, they Trade *ſuper altum mare*, bartering immediate Money for our Commodities at an extraordinary Rate.

The reaſon is plain; becauſe Goods ſent from *England* or *Holland* to *Cadiz*, there paying Freight and Charges, with a Cuſtom of 23 *l. per Cent.* to the King of *Spain*, and afterwards reſhipt on board the Galeons, paying a ſecond Freight, with ſome Indulto at their lading on board, and again at their landing in *America*, muſt of neceſſity be ſold dearer than Goods brought directly from *England*.

Now if the Prohibition on our ſide be but removed, the Trade of *Cadiz*, as far as reſpects *Engliſh* Goods, would be ruined.

'Tis acknowledg'd this would be very detrimental to the *Spaniſh* Trade; but a Trade carried on by Stealth

Stealth could be neither very durable, nor very conſiderable, and therefore could never amount to an Equivalent to the Loſs of that great Branch of our Trade from *England* to *Cadiz*.

Another Anſwer may be given as to the Damage of Trade, That a Powerful Union between *Holland* and *England*, for the Augmentation of their Naval Strength, in order to preſerve always the Command of the Seas, will be effectual either to preſcribe the *French*, though they are united with the *Spaniard*, within the Ancient Regulations of Trade, or to prohibit their own Trade to their *American* Colonies, nay, even to take all *America* from them.

To this I ſay, *Spain* indeed, as now conſider'd in the hands of the *Spaniards*, has but an inconſiderable Naval Power; but *Spain* in the hands of the *French* muſt be otherwiſe conſider'd.

The *French* are a Nation who improve every thing to the utmoſt; they are a diligent indefatigable people; if it be poſſible to recover the Naval Power of *Spain* (as no doubt it is), they will recover it: And what a prodigious Extent of the Sea will they poſſeſs by a contiguous Coaſt from *Dunkirk* to the *Streights*-mouth; (for I muſt ſuppoſe *Portugal* to be ſwallow'd up by them, it cannot be avoided, the Pretenſions to that Crown are ſo great, and the Power to oppoſe them ſo ſmall;) and from the *Streights*-mouth, a few ſmall Ports excepted, quite to *Loretto* on the *Eaſt* ſide of *Italy*, almoſt to *Venice*: They muſt be a more ſlothful People than the *Spaniards*, if they do not make themſelves the ſtrongeſt Nation at Sea in the World.

And if they are ſo, no Trade can be ſecur'd to us, but ſuch as ſome particular advantage to themſelves, makes it their Intereſt to permit.

In a word, It ſeems to me that Trade in general will lie too much at the Mercy of the *French* ever to be of any Advantage to their Neighbours, and I'll inſtance in one particular Trade, in which at preſent we rival that Nation, *viz.* the *Newfoundland* Fiſhing.

We take our Fiſh on the Banks of *Newfoundland*, and on the Coaſt of *New England*, and the *French* do the like; the Market is general, and equal to both Nations; if there be any advantage, 'tis on the ſide of the *Engliſh*; but if *Spain*, which is the place where all this Fiſh is diſpoſed of, falls into the hands of the *French*, 'tis but Prohibiting Fiſh, excepting in their own Bottoms, and all our *Newfoundland* Colonies muſt ſink and be deſerted, and Three hundred Sail of Ships be at once unemployed.

That ſuch a Prohibition would be the conſequence of ſuch a Union, is as natural as can be, and no one could blame the *French* neither, for we would do the ſame our ſelves.

The Trade to *Venice*, to *Italy*, and to *Turkey*, would have like Circumſtances and Conſequences, for the *French* would keep the Key of the *Mediterranean*, and they would be very much to blame if they let any paſs the *Streights* Mouth without paying them ſuch a Toll, as that all thoſe Trades ſhould be managed by us under conſiderable diſadvantage, if they were not entirely loſt.

To ſpeak of the *Dutch*, whoſe Fiſhery in a great meaſure is the ſtaple of their Navigation, this Fiſhery depends as much upon their St. *Ubies* Fleet for Salt, as the Brewers in *London* do upon the *New-Caſtle* Fleet for Coals: Should this Union of *France* and *Spain* ſucceed, and *Portugal* be ſubdued, 'tis in the power of the *French* to deſtroy all the *Dutch* Fiſhery, by laying a great

great Duty on the Salt at St. *Vbies*, while their own Subjects ſhall have it as before; by which means the *French* ſhall bring their Herrings Cheaper to Market, and conſequently have all the Trade.

The Inſtances which might be given of this nature are too many to be included in this ſhort Diſcourſe, and too plain to need it; a very mean capacity as to Trade may make a judgment of it.

From the whole I take the freedom to draw this Concluſion, that ſuch a Union of Two ſuch Powerful Monarchies as *France* and *Spain*, would be very pernicious to the Trade of *England* and *Holland* in general, and abſolutely deſtructive to ſome branches of it in particular; it would be hazardous to the Peace and Liberty of the *Dutch*, and abſolutely inconſiſtent with the Ballance of Power in *Europe*; it would be fatal to the Princes of *Italy*, the *Cantons* of *Switzerland*, and the Kingdom of *Portugal*; 'twould be very troubleſome and uneaſy to the Empire, and would very much endanger the Liberty of *Chriſtendom*.

And if ſo, then it muſt be the Intereſt of all the Princes of *Europe* to join their Forces with the utmoſt vigour, and endeavour to prevent it.

'Tis certainly the Intereſt of *England* and *Holland* to preſerve the Freedom of their Commerce and their Empire of the Seas; and I ſee no event in the World that is in the leaſt probable to deprive 'em of it but this; no Union in the World but this can put any Prince or People, or Confederacy in a condition ſo much as to diſpute it with them; *France* by it ſelf cannot do it, as has appear'd this laſt War; *Spain* is in no probable Circumſtances for it; but *France* and *Spain* together ſeems to be plac'd in a Scituation for the Univerſal Government of *Europe*.

'Tis

'Tis certainly the Intereſt of the Princes of *Italy*, by all that is poſſible for them to do, to prevent this Union; and that is ſo plain from all the Hiſtories of thoſe Countries as to the Times when the *French* were Maſters of the greateſt part of *Italy*, that it needs no other demonſtration.

Portugal has nothing to protect her, but the difference between thoſe Two Nations, as I noted of *Savoy*, that when ſhe is Oppreſt by one, ſhe may have Succour from the other; for I think it can hardly be ſuppoſed that the *French* King would omit uniting that ſmall Kingdom to his Empire, having a kind of a Right to it by a former Poſſeſſion.

Germany has various Reaſons to oppoſe this Union. Firſt, Becauſe the real Right is in the Emperor or Duke of *Bavaria*, or both, rather than *France*, if the Article of the Renunciation be good, as no doubt it is. Now the Title to the Crown of *Spain* being renounced before it was really a Title, ſeems to take off all Pretences of Exception; for the King of *France* did not quit a Title which he had, but agreed to remain without a Title which he had not; and the Renuncation was made by the Two Kings, not by the *Infanta* only, but by her Father too; as appears by the particular Words of the Renunciation, which are as follow: *Placuit utrique Regi pactione inſtar legis ſemper valiturâ ſancire, ne unquam ſereniſſima Infans Tereſa, aut poſteri ejus ulli, ad ſeros uſque Nepotes, quocunque gradu ſint, admittantur ad ſucceſſionem ullam, ſive Regnorum, ſive Principatuum, Provinciarum, Ditionum, Dominiorum quorumcunque Regis Catholici, non obſtante lege ulla, conſuetudine aut alio Jure in contrarium, cui utriuſque*

utriusque Regis authoritate plenissimè derogatur, contemplatione dictæ æqualitatis, & publicæ utilitatis quæ inde emanatura speratur. It was consented to by both their Majesties, and by them confirm'd, that neither the most Serene Infanta Teresa, *nor any of her Issue or Posterity, in what degree soever, be admitted to succeed in any of the Kingdoms, Dukedoms, Provinces, or Dominions of his Catholick Majesty, any other Custom, Constitution, or Law to the contrary notwithstanding: So that if any such Custom or Constitution were, it was by authority of both Kings absolutely annull'd and destroyed. And this only to adjust the Dominion of both Crowns, so as each of them might receive an equal benefit by it.*

Lastly, 'Tis the Interest of *Spain* it self to oppose this Union; for whereas it is not an addition of *France* to *Spain*, but of *Spain* to *France*, it changes it from a Soveraign Self dependant Kingdom, and one of the most powerful in the World to a Province of the *French* Empire; to be subject to the Laws and Maxims of a Nation, whose Genius and Tempers are as directly contrary to one another, as Heat and Moisture, as Light and Darkness; 'tis Subjecting the *Spanish* Nation to a People for whom they have ever had a stated mortal aversion, from whom they differ in every thing that Nature can contrive two opposite Constitutions to partake of; differ in Complexion, differ in Temper, differ in Customs, in Habits, in Manners, in every thing but Religion.

To Conclude; I firmly believe that to all this may be added, That notwithstanding the *French* Greatness and Policy, 'tis no difficult matter effectually to prevent this Union, if His Catholick Majesty should dye,

and

and that without involving *Europe* in a new War, unleſs the Moſt Chriſtian King ſhould reſent any Preventive Methods to ſuch a Degree, as to declare War himſelf againſt the Confederates.

How this may be done, is not the buſineſs of this Paper; nor is it an Affair proper for a Pamphlet. I doubt not but thoſe Princes which God has plac'd at the Helm of Government in *Europe*, underſtand both the Means and the Time for ſuch a Work, being no more without Council to Direct, than without Power to Perform; and to them I refer it.

FINIS.